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INTRODUCTION
In June 2013 the disclosure of the now-infamous Verizon
order—leaked by Edward Snowden and published by the
Guardian—shocked the public. The order required disclosure
to the NSA all records of domestic and international calls on
Verizon Business Network Services—an order which swept in
the call records of millions of Americans. 1 The order,

* Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation.
1. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, BR 13-80 FISC (July 19, 2013);
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers
Daily,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
6,
2013),
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splashed across the pages of a British newspaper complete
with its TOP SECRET markings, caused a tremendous public
outcry. Rightfully, the public was taken aback by the order’s
sweeping breadth, the NSA’s gathering of information on
Americans, and, for many, the revelation that America had a
secret surveillance court.
However, to those watching surveillance issues closely,
the existence of the program was no secret. Indeed, details of
the program were first published in USA Today, seven years
before the Guardian’s story. 2 While the program’s existence
was not entirely secret, its legal basis was. And, with no
public law that explicitly authorized such conduct, civil
liberties advocates were left wondering: How could this be
legal? 3 Nevertheless, aside from grumblings from a few
members of Congress, the government had been able to stay
remarkably silent about the ways it had interpreted Section
215, the provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
it relied on to obtain call records in bulk. 4
The public debate that followed the Guardian’s disclosure
did not prove to be a ringing endorsement of that secret legal
interpretation or the democratic processes that gave rise to it.
Less than a year after the program’s full public disclosure,
the call records collection program appears to be on its last
legs, both legally and politically. At least one court has
declared it unconstitutional; 5 two separate, independent
executive branch oversight bodies have recommended its
end; 6 President Obama has signaled he intends to end the
program; 7 and, after reviewing the program for only a few
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizoncourt-order.
2. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls,
USA
TODAY
(May
11,
2006),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm.
3. The short answer: it’s not.
4. See infra at 5–11.
5. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
6. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS.,
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013); DAVID MEDINE ET AL.,
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014).
7. Anita Kumar, Obama Signals Changes Likely to NSA Spying,
MCCLATCHY
WASHINGTON
BUREAU
(Dec.
20,
2013),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/welcome_page/?shf=/2013/12/20/212377_obama-
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months, government officials were able to conceive of ways of
achieving the call records collection program’s objectives in a
manner more sensitive to civil liberties. 8 For a program that,
as the government touted, “all three branches of government”
participated in, one would expect it could survive more than a
year’s worth of public scrutiny. 9
The story of Section 215 serves as a cautionary tale for
excluding the public from the debate on surveillance
techniques and the interpretation of federal surveillance
laws.
But the problem of secret reinterpretation of
surveillance laws is not one unique to Section 215. It is a
problem that constantly recurs: as new surveillance
technologies or programs emerge, government officials
inevitably seek to press those techniques into service within
already existing legal authorities. Because law enforcement
officials are hesitant to disclose these techniques, and the
legal analysis supporting them, for fear of disclosing
surveillance “sources and methods,” the public is left in the
dark—both about the use of new techniques and the legal
authority that supports it. 10
This article proposes a modest solution for the problem of
secret interpretations of surveillance law. The Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), with only a measured extension of
current law and practice, is well-equipped to guard against
precisely this problem. Using a stalwart of FOIA litigation,
the Vaughn index, this Article argues that courts should and,
indeed, are already empowered to compel the government to
provide summaries of the legal rationale underlying
otherwise-sensitive surveillance programs.
This type of
modified Vaughn index—a “tearline Vaughn”—could help
bridge the current gap between the government’s need to
protect “sources and methods” and the democratic need for
public accountability and legitimacy.

signals-changes-likely-to.html.
8. Statement of Administration Policy, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Nov.
17,
2014),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saps2685s
20141117.pdf.
9. See Cheryl Pellerin, Officials Discuss Intelligence Programs at Senate
Hearing,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE
(Sept.
27,
2013),
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120873.
10. See infra Part II.A.
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THE SECRET STORY OF SECTION 215

In a 2011 speech on the Senate floor, Senator Ron Wyden
ominously declared:
I have served on the Intelligence Committee for over a
decade and I wish to deliver a warning this
afternoon. When the American people find out how their
government has secretly interpreted the PATRIOT Act,
they are going to be stunned and they are going to be
angry. . . . The fact is anyone can read the plain text of the
PATRIOT Act. Yet many Members of Congress have no
idea how the law is being secretly interpreted by the
executive branch[.] 11

That day came on June 5, 2013, when, as described
above, the Guardian published an order issued by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. 12 But the story of Section
215 and the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ call records
began over a decade before.
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the NSA began
collecting Americans’ call records in bulk from two major
telecommunication companies. 13 In the beginning of the
program, there were no court orders; instead, the companies
were provided with presidential “authorizations” that stated
the Attorney General had determined the program to be
legal. 14
For nearly five years, the call records program continued
in secret—alongside other NSA domestic surveillance
programs— “justified” on the basis of the President’s inherent
executive authority alone. 15 In December 2005, NSA’s
domestic surveillance programs made their first public
appearances. First, the New York Times reported that
President Bush had authorized the NSA to spy within the
11. 157 CONG. REC. S3,386 (daily ed. May 26, 2011).
12. Greenwald, supra note 1.
13. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ST-09-0002 WORKING DRAFT 33–
34
(2009),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspectorgeneral-report-document-data-collection [hereinafter OIG WORKING DRAFT
REPORT]. A third company began providing call detail records in December
2002.
14. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE
PRESIDENT’S
SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM
(2009),
available
at
www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf; OIG WORKING DRAFT REPORT, supra note 13.
15. Id. at 39–40.
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United States without warrants. 16 Then in May 2006, USA
Today disclosed the call records program. 17 While President
Bush and other government officials confirmed portions of the
Times’ account, the government managed to avoid confirming
the accuracy of USA Today’s story. 18
While the disclosures did not change the government’s
legal approach, the firms participating in the program
developed cold feet. Shortly after the New York Times
disclosures, lawsuits were filed across the country against
telecommunication companies, like AT&T and Verizon,
alleging violations of federal wiretapping and privacy laws by
assisting the government. 19 In light of these suits, and to put
the disclosure of call records to the NSA on ostensibly firmer
legal footing, the telcos requested that the call records
program be shifted to a court-ordered regime. 20 By May 24,
2006—less than a month after the program’s disclosure in
USA Today—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) issued its first Section 215 order for the bulk collection
of Americans’ call records. 21
The provision of law the government relied on, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861, is commonly known as Section 215—taking its name
from the provision of the USA PATRIOT Act of which it was a
part.
The Patriot Act amended the “business records”
provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Section 215 broadened what had previously been a narrow
authority to obtain records of “common carriers,” such as
hotel records, car rental records, and storage unit rentals. 22
It authorized the FBI, upon an application to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, to compel the production of
“any tangible thing[]” from a third-party that was “relevant”
to an authorized foreign intelligence investigation. 23 It is this
statutory language that was stretched to give the NSA, not
16. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.
17. Cauley, supra note 2.
18. See id.
19. NSA Multi-District Litigation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/cases/nsa-multi-district-litigation.
20. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 14.
21. See id.
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2006).
23. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006).
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the FBI, the authority to obtain past and future call record
information on millions of Americans with no connection to
terrorism or any other “authorized foreign intelligence
investigation.” 24
Of course, the FISC’s orders remained secret, and the
program continued largely unchanged and uninterrupted.
Although Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys publicly
disclosed that Section 215 orders were being used to support
a “sensitive collection program” in 2009, 25 from 2006 to 2013,
Section 215 was discussed only fleetingly in public, primarily
in the context of Section 215’s various reauthorizations.
In 2009, Senator Richard Durbin, a member of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that “the government’s
use of Section 215 is unfortunately cloaked in secrecy. Some
day that cloak will be lifted, and future generations will ask
whether our actions today meet the test of a democratic
society: transparency, accountability, and fidelity to the rule
of law and our Constitution.” 26 Similarly, then-Senator Russ
Feingold, a member of both the Senate Judiciary Committee
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”),
stated: “There is information about the use of Section 215
orders that I believe Congress and the American people
deserve to know . . . at least basic information about how they
have been used.” 27
In May 2011, two Senators on the SSCI again voiced
public concerns about the government’s use of Section 215
orders. Senator Mark Udall echoed concerns, similar to his
colleagues earlier concerns, about the scope of Section 215:
“Congress is granting powers to the [E]xecutive [B]ranch that
lead to abuse, and frankly, shield the [E]xecutive [B]ranch
from accountability.” 28 Two days later, Senator Udall argued
that the executive’s “official interpretation of” the nation’s
24. Id. § 1861.
25. Hearing on the USA Patriot Act Before the Subcomm. on Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. 8
(2009) (testimony of Todd Hinnen).
26. Executive Business Meeting Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 111 Cong. (2009) (Remarks of Sen. Richard Durbin) (Remarks begin
at 68:00), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executivebusiness-meeting-2009-10-01.
27. 155 CONG. REC. S9,563 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Feingold).
28. 157 CONG. REC. S3258 (daily ed. May 24, 2011).
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laws should not “be kept secret.” 29 To that end, when Section
215 was scheduled to expire in 2011, Senators Wyden and
Udall co-sponsored an amendment to its reauthorization,
requiring government officials to “not secretly reinterpret
public laws and statutes” and to “not describe the execution of
these laws in a way that misinforms or misleads the public.” 30
In a September 2011 letter, Senators Wyden and Udall
again criticized DOJ officials for making “misleading
statements pertaining to the government’s interpretation of
surveillance laws.” 31 The letter criticized DOJ’s claims that
Section 215 was being used in ways analogous to grand jury
subpoenas, claims the Senators “consider[ed] highly
misleading” and that “provide[d] the public with a false
understanding of how surveillance law is interpreted in
practice.” 32 The letter also criticized DOJ’s claims that
Section 215 was not a “secret law;” as the letter noted, “when
the government relies on significant interpretations of public
statutes that are kept secret from the American public, the
government is effectively relying on secret law.” 33
Finally, in March 2012, Senators Wyden and Udall wrote
in a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder noting that it “is a
matter of public record that Section 215, which is a public
statute,
has
been
the
subject
of
secret
legal
interpretations . . . [contained in] opinions issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.” 34 The letter noted
that the American public has a “need and a right to know how
[Section 215] is being interpreted, so that they can ratify or
reject decisions made on their behalf.” 35 The letter continued
that “American laws . . . should not be made public only when
government officials find it convenient. They should be public
all the time, and every American should be able to find out

29. See 157 CONG. REC. S3,388–89 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Udall).
30. See 157 CONG. REC. S3,360 (daily ed. May 25, 2011) (SA 384 to S. 1038,
112th Cong. § 3 (2011)).
31. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden and Sen. Mark Udall, to Attorney General
Eric Holder 1 (Sept. 21, 2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1–2.
34. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden and Sen. Mark Udall, to Attorney General
Eric Holder 1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
35. Id. at 1–2.
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what their government thinks those laws mean.” 36
In October 2011, on the tenth anniversary of the Patriot
Act, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed separate
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits against the
DOJ. 37 The lawsuits sought to uncover the “secret legal
interpretation” of Section 215 about which elected officials
had warned. 38 For nearly three years, the lawsuits yielded
only limited information.
Early in the case, the ACLU sought partial summary
judgment motion on the withholding of a single document. 39
The ACLU contended the document contained Section 215’s
secret legal interpretation; the government, for its part,
claimed that the document only described classified
surveillance techniques and did not, in fact, contain any legal
interpretation. 40 After reviewing the document in camera, a
judge in the Southern District of New York agreed, and
granted partial summary judgment for the government. 41
While the case continued for the balance of the responsive
documents, the suit largely languished.
EFF’s suit fared little better. EFF identified a series of
FISC opinions withheld by the government that, EFF argued,
contained the secret interpretation of Section 215. 42 The
government, for its part, claimed everything within the
opinions was classified: the dates the opinions were issued,
the topics of the opinions, even the number of pages that were
36. Id. at 2.
37. EFF Sues for Answers About Patriot Act on Law’s 10th Anniversary,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Oct.
26,
2011),
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-sues-answers-about-patriot-act-laws-10thanniversary; Anna Estevao, ACLU Sues Government to Find Out Secret
Interpretation
of
Patriot
Act,
ACLU
(Oct.
26,
2011),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-sues-government-find-outsecret-interpretation-patriot-act.
38. Id.
39. Mem. & Order, ACLU v. FBI, No. 11-cv-7562-WHP (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
available
at
https://www.aclu.org/files/section215/DistrictCourtProceedings/sec215_order_gr
anting_goverment_motion_for_summary_judgment_may_17_2012.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Notice of Mot. for Pl., Electronic Frontier Foundation v. United States
Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at
https://www.eff.org/document/effs-opposition-and-cross-motion-summaryjudgment.
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in the opinions. 43 Although a court in the Northern District of
California ordered the government to disclose some
information about the opinions, three years after filing suit,
the government’s secret interpretation remained safely under
wraps. 44
The Guardian’s June 2013 article disclosed what the
courts had refused to do—the program and its legal
underpinnings. As a result of the disclosure of the call
records program in the Guardian, and the government’s
confirmation of the program, there was no longer a sound
basis for refusing to disclose the secret legal interpretations
that the government relied on to support those programs.
Consequently, EFF and ACLU’s lawsuits resulted in the
release of hundreds of pages of previously secret FISC
opinions on Section 215. 45
The proposals in this article, if implemented, can help
prevent a similar scenario from occurring in the future.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF SECRET (SURVEILLANCE) LAW
AND THE TRADITIONAL WAYS TO AVOID IT

A. The Problem of Secret (Surveillance) Law
Broadly speaking, secret law obstructs democratic
accountability and legitimacy. 46 By obstructing citizen
oversight of the manner in which government officials
interpret and implement the law, it is impossible to
knowledgeably (1) reform the laws; (2) ratify interpretations

43. Mem. of P. & A. for Def., Electronic Frontier Foundation v. United
States Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at
https://www.eff.org/document/department-justices-opposition-and-reply.
44. Order Re: Further Submission on Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Department of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221YGR, (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/document/courts-orderrequiring-further-submissions-defendants.
45. See, e.g., Trevor Timm, Hundreds of Pages of NSA Spying Documents to
be Released as Result of EFF Lawsuit, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsaspying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit.
46. There is little need to dwell on the problems presented by secret law. As
one commentator has noted, “condemnation of secret law seems too easy,
because it is morally and politically over determined, after two centuries worth
of the rhetoric and developing practice of liberalism and democratic selfgovernment.” Christopher Kutz, The Repugnance of Secret Law, UC BERKELEY
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.usc.edu/centers/clp/papers/documents/Kutz.pdf.
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of current law; or (3) hold political officials to account
(whether through support or condemnation) 47 Without the
pressure of accountability, democratic legitimacy, in turn,
falls away.
The problem of secret law in the surveillance context
deserves additional attention because the problems posed by
secret law are exaggerated in the surveillance context. In
general, the interpretation of laws by government officials
cause government action that, in turn, has recognizable
physical effects—interpretation of tax laws results in tax
liens; traffic laws, traffic tickets; and so on. Indeed, even
otherwise “secret” government action typically produces some
physical manifestation of that action: for example, try as the
government might to keep its drone strikes in the Middle
East a secret, as public evidence and real world effects
accumulated,
government
secrecy
concerning
those
operations (and, relatedly, their legal justification) became
increasingly difficult to shield from public scrutiny. 48
Surveillance is different.
As the Supreme Court
recognized in United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith case),
electronic surveillance—with its “broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy”—
requires heightened attention. 49 Surveillance, unlike most
forms of government action, is by its very nature clandestine.
It can be difficult, if not impossible, to detect, and thus its
public disclosure through observation is less likely. 50
47. Id.
48. Cora Courrier, How the Gov’t Talks About A Drone Program It Won’t
Acknowledge
Exists,
PROPUBLICA
(Sept.
13,
2012),
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-govt-talks-about-a-drone-program-itwont-acknowledge. The CIA’s drone program exemplifies the absurdity of the
government’s continued insistence on secrecy: secrecy is difficult when, for
example, a Twitter feed (https://twitter.com/dronestream) publicly catalogues
each reported government strike.
49. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
50. This is not to say that surveillance has no effect, particularly on those
being surveilled. See generally Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). Obviously, and as the Supreme Court
recognized in Keith, government incursions into conversational privacy are,
themselves, one effect which must be guarded against. It is also not to say that
it is impossible to detect electronic surveillance, depending on the method of
surveillance employed. Finally, this is not to say surveillance is the only type of
covert government action. Obviously, a great deal of government activity,
particularly in the national security context, occurs covertly. However, I see no
reason that the principles which this article advances—access to the legal
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As new surveillance techniques or activities come to
fruition, law enforcement officials are quick to fit them within
existing legal authorities and frameworks with varying
degrees of credibility. In the “competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,” 51 secrecy—both for surveillance
techniques and their legal bases—is suggested to be a
necessary evil: secrecy is necessary, it is argued, so that
criminals cannot thwart legitimate government surveillance.
As a corollary, secrecy for the technique is used to justify
secrecy for the legal analysis. If the legal basis for an
otherwise secret surveillance technique is disclosed,
government officials argue, that would inevitably result in
disclosure of the technique itself. 52
This theory has justified the concealment of a great
number of surveillance activities and a great many legal
interpretations. Recent examples include: the suppression of
information concerning law enforcement’s use of Stingray
devices; 53 secrecy in Office of Legal Counsel’s memoranda
concerning
authoritative
interpretations
of
federal
surveillance law; 54 and, perhaps most saliently, the legal
opinions of the FISC. 55 Each of these varieties of secret
surveillance law has been perpetuated on the basis that
disclosure of the legal rationale would, itself, reveal the
technique.

principles animating surveillance—could not apply to other covert activities.
51. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
52. See e.g., Final Brief for Appellee at 42–47, Electronic Frontier
Foundation v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-5363 (11th Cir. June 7, 2013),
available at https://www.eff.org/document/dojs-appellate-brief; Motion at 14,
Electronic Frontier Foundation v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 05221 (N.D. Cal.
2014),
available
at
https://www.eff.org/document/doj-motion-summaryjudgment-1.
53. Feds intervening to suppress disclosure of stingray records in FL; or
recent muckrock article re: FBI rider in all stingray contracts that info must
remain secret; Shawn Musgrave, Before They Could Track Cell Phone Data,
Police Had to Sign a NDA with the FBI, MUCKROCK (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2014/sep/22/they-could-track-cellphone-data-police-had-sign-n/.
54. The Editorial Board, What Happened to Transparency?, NEW YORK
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/opinion/whathappened-to-transparency.html.
55. Charlie Savage & Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved,
Extending U.S. Spies’ Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/us/how-a-courts-secret-evolution-extendedspies-reach.html.
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A. Traditional Ways of Avoiding Secret Law and Their
Shortcomings: Congressional Investigation, Discovery,
Leaks, and FOIA
The government does not always rely upon secret legal
interpretations of federal law and the Constitution. At least
three mechanisms currently exist to counteract secret
interpretations of federal law: Congressional investigation,
discovery, leaks, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Through disclosures based on these three mechanisms, legal
interpretations can then be tested in adversarial proceedings
or reviewed and scrutinized in the court of public opinion.
Either of these types of disclosure, in court or to the public,
serves the ultimate goal of ensuring public ratification and
legitimizing interpretations of law on which the government
operates. But, as will be discussed, each of these mechanisms
has its own disadvantages as well.
1. Congressional Investigation
Of all the methods of disclosing secret interpretations of
law, Congressional investigation may be the most potent.
Congress, obviously, is a coequal branch of government,
empowered to investigate the actions of the executive
branch. 56 This authority, in the past, has been powerfully
exercised to uncover intelligence agency actions and their
purported legal bases.
The Church and Pike Committees are the highest
examples of the robust power of Congressional investigation
to provide the public with information about the actions of
intelligence agencies. Following a series of reports concerning
illegal actions by intelligence agencies, 57 Congress convened
the two committees to investigate the actions of the CIA,
NSA, and FBI. 58 The hearings and reports of the committees
resulted in the most expansive, and public, look at the actions

56. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–175 (1927)
57. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. operation reported in U.S. against
antiwar forces, other dissidents in Nixon years, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 22,
1974).
58. Gerald K. Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,
Studies
in
Intelligence
(Winter
1998-99),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99.
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of American intelligence agencies in our nation’s history. 59
The recommendations of the committees led to numerous
reforms, including the creation of standing Congressional
committees overseeing intelligence agency conduct and the
passage of new laws, like the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, to rein in intelligence agency conduct. 60
The standing committees, in turn, have continued their
oversight of intelligence agency conduct. At times, this
oversight has lead to thorough and public reviews of
intelligence agency conduct. 61 More often, however, committee
oversight has meant closed door briefings and, at best, public
hints at the edges 62 But, even with continued oversight of
intelligence committees, it is clear that the mechanisms for
preventing the development of secret law have failed. Section
215, a perfect example of secret agency reinterpretation,
occurred under the careful watch of both Congressional
intelligence committees. 63 The probable reasons for this
breakdown—distorted
classification
policy,
committee
capture, institutional deficiencies, or other reasons 64 —are
beyond the scope of this Article. But, suffice it to say,
Congressional oversight, although a potentially potent tool,
failed spectacularly and publicly in preventing the
development of secret surveillance law.
2. Discovery
The first, and perhaps most common, method for
compelled disclosure of the government’s legal interpretations
supporting law enforcement techniques is through disclosure
59. See Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Agencies, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976) (7 volume report on actions
of intelligence agencies).
60. See
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCo
mmittee.htm.
61. See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Dec.
13, 2014)
62. See supra at 105–06.
63. Id.
64. Amy P. Zegart, The Roots of Weak Congressional Intelligence
Oversight, TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW, available at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Zegart.
pdf; DENNIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., NO MERE OVERSIGHT, CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN (2006).
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during discovery in criminal and, to a lesser extent, civil
cases. In the criminal context, the government is required to
disclose the methods employed to obtain the evidence it will
rely on at trial. 65 If the government relied on a novel
surveillance technique or novel legal authority, a criminal
defendant (with competent counsel) will challenge the legality
of that technique in an attempt to suppress the evidence.
And, in the course of briefing the suppression issue, the
government’s legal theories will necessarily be disclosed—and
tested—in adversarial proceedings. 66 Civil cases, too, can
allow for public disclosure of the government’s legal
interpretation supporting a particular technique. 67
Examples are plentiful: in United States v. Ringmaiden,
a criminal defendant challenged the government’s use of a
“Stingray”—a device that “catches” the International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of cell phones in an area for the
purpose of tracking an individual’s movements. 68 In United
States v. Forrester, a defendant challenged the use of an
internet pen-register device. 69 Perhaps more prominently, in
Kyllo v. United States, a criminal defendant challenged the
warrantless use of thermal imaging technology that led to a
conviction for marijuana cultivation. 70 And in United States
v. Jones, the defendant challenged the government’s use of
GPS tracking to secure a conviction for drug conspiracy and
distribution. 71
But limiting disclosure of legal theories to those
occurring in criminal cases leaves gaps in public
understanding. This is so because prosecutors only disclose
that a new technique has been used when the government
65. See, e.g., Brady v. State of Maryland, 273 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 31 (1972).
66. Kevin Poulsen, Documents: FBI Spyware Has Been Snaring
Extortionists,
Hackers
for
Years,
WIRED
(Apr.
16,
2009),
http://www.wired.com/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/.
67. Although absent indisputable proof the surveillance has occurred—the
government has used questions of standing to avoid addressing the substantive
legality of surveillance. See Amnesty v. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
68. Hanni Fakhoury, Stingrays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell
Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
(Oct.
22,
2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggestunknown-technological-threat-cell-phone-privacy.
69. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007).
70. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
71. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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intends to introduce that evidence or rely on evidence derived
from the technique. And, as recent disclosures confirm, law
enforcement often takes great pains to avoid disclosing that a
particular technique has been used or has generated evidence
derived from the technique. 72 This type of investigatory
“laundering,” in turn, precludes a public understanding, and
adversarial testing, of the legal basis for the technique (even
if the technique’s legality has been reviewed internally within
the executive branch).
Recent disclosures concerning the Drug Enforcement
Agency’s (DEA) use of NSA-derived information illustrates
the problem. To avoid informing criminal defendants that
information used in their arrest had been derived from NSA
surveillance, DEA engaged in “parallel construction”: that is,
the collection of evidence, through independent and
alternative means of investigation, originally obtained
through NSA’s surveillance programs. 73 The government has
taken a similarly recalcitrant approach to its disclosure
obligations under the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), a 2008
law that authorized broad, warrantless surveillance of
international communications. 74 Not a single criminal
defendant was notified that FAA surveillance had been used
from the laws passage, in 2008, until September 2013. 75
Consequently, the government effectively obstructed review
of the constitutionality of the law and the surveillance
conducted under its authority. Aside from the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment problems stemming from the government’s
secretive approach, the public suffers—it is blocked from
understanding the legal authorities that animate government
conduct.
A similar problem arises in the conduct of intelligence
programs or techniques, especially those occurring abroad,
that never give rise to criminal prosecution. Although not
72. See, e.g., John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs
Agents to Cover Up Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sodidUSBRE97409R20130805.
73. Id.
74. 50 U.S.C § 1881(a).
75. Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, In A Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless
Wiretapes
As
Evidence,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-citewarrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html.
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involving surveillance law, the government’s legal rationale
for the targeted killing of Americans’ abroad amply
demonstrates the dilemma. Given that the government was
contemplating an extrajudicial killing of an American citizen,
the chance that the legal justification for conducting that
killing would arise in a criminal trial was, obviously,
minimal. In the surveillance context, the government
undertakes a great many surveillance techniques and
procedures abroad, the vast majority of which will never lead
to a criminal prosecution. Consequently, under current
practices, the accompanying legal analysis may never see
public disclosure.
3. Leaks
In general, there are two kinds of leaks 76—authorized
leaks and unauthorized leaks. For different reasons, neither
is an ideal vehicle for eliminating secret law.
First, authorized leaks, done by government officials with
the approval of the relevant policymakers, have a variety of
purposes, from floating a proposed policy 77 to disclosing
otherwise sensitive information that aids a particular policy
or initiative. 78 The difficulty with relying on the authorized
leak is that it depends wholly on the decision-making of
policymakers. It thus entrusts the disclosure of the law to the
same policymakers that chose to develop it in secret in the
first instance. Therefore, the authorized leak is not a
promising solution to combating secret law.
The unauthorized leak also does not offer a complete
solution, but for different reasons. At the outset, there are

76. For a far more comprehensive treatment on the subject of leaks and
their various types, see David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the
Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127
HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). Pozen describes and catalogues a far greater number
of types of leaks than “authorized” and “unauthorized,” however all identified
types still seem to fall within one category or the other. See id. at 532.
77. This type of leak is often known as a trial-balloon leak. See id. at 532.
78. One example of this type of leak is the thwarting of a terrorist attack or
the killing of a high-ranking terrorist leader. Often the operations, and the
facts themselves, are classified, yet the success of these missions is often
intentionally revealed to the press. See, e.g., Greg Young & Karen DeYoung, Al
Queda airline bomb plot disrupted, U.S. says, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 7,
2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ciadisrupts-airline-bomb-plot/2012/05/07/gIQA9qE08T_story.html.
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obviously problems with depending on unauthorized leaks for
the disclosure of secret law. Most obviously, it requires a
person with knowledge or access to the law to leak
documents; in the absence of a leaker, the public is beholden
to the government’s disclosure decisions. But, even when a
leaker exists, unauthorized leaks carry risk. Although the
unauthorized leak has the capacity to disclose secret law, an
authorized leak’s various permutations—from document
dumps to leaks of single documents—often removes
knowledgeable policymakers from the process of determining
what will, and what will not, cause harm through disclosure.
Consequently, the unauthorized leak risks overdisclosure of
sensitive information. This is not to say that government
officials do not, with regularity, speak in greatly hyperbolic
terms about the damage that unauthorized leaks do to
But, even if regularly
national security. 79 They do.
overstated, the concern is a legitimate one. It is quite easy to
envision circumstances in which disclosure of government
secrets could cause irreparable harm. This is so, even when
the document disclosed consists solely of legal analysis.
Invariably, that legal analysis would include discussion of
specific facts or information that could reveal legitimately
classified or sensitive information. Removing the government
and relevant policymakers from the disclosure process
entirely would thus threaten disclosure of sensitive
information.
Of course, as a practical matter, established media
outlets often work with the government before publishing
leaked documents in order to withhold information the
government claims cannot be disclosed. 80 In this respect,
unauthorized leaks are an improvement over authorized
leaks, in that a third-party (the media) examines the
government’s claims of harm to national security and makes
decisions based on its own judgment. Nevertheless, that

79. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, Live and Let Leak, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2014),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140754/jack-shafer/live-andlet-leak (describing “irreparable harm” that would flow from the publication of
plans for a hydrogen bomb and the Pentagon Papers, neither of which came to
fruition).
80. See, e.g., A Note to Readers: The Decision to Publish Diplomatic
Documents,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
28,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29editornote.html.
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process is an imperfect one, too. First, media outlets can be
swayed by hyperbolic government claims. For example, the
New York Times delayed its publication of a story on
warrantless wiretapping for nearly two years, apparently in
response to government claims of harm to national security. 81
Second, although the judgment of publishers is interposed
between the government and disclosure, it is not clear that
publisher’s judgment is the ideal one. Aside from possible
subject-matter knowledge and (purported) journalistic
neutrality, on its face, there is little more that redeems the
judgment of a newspaper publisher over that of
democratically accountable policymaker. Again, this is not to
impugn journalists and the media. Professional journalists
often exercise remarkable judgment about what should and
should not be disclosed—often achieving a far more
meaningful balance than government officials. But not all
leaks are created equal; nor are all publishers of leaks. In the
hands of less careful, or less interested, publishers,
unauthorized disclosures serve as an imperfect vehicle for
disclosure of secret law.
4. FOIA
An established but oft-maligned tool of public
accountability is the FOIA. FOIA’s “basic purpose,” according
to the Supreme Court, is no less than to “ensure an informed
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society,
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors
accountable to the governed.” 82 The Act’s primary purpose is
disclosure not secrecy, and the law requires federal agencies
to disclose records requested by any individual. 83 While
exemptions from the Act’s disclosure requirements exist—for
example, for protecting law enforcement techniques, 84 and
protecting “intelligence sources and methods” 85 —those

81. Margaret Sullivan, Lessons in Surveillance Drama Redux, THE NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
9,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/public-editor/sullivan-lessons-in-asurveillance-drama-redux.html.
82. NLRB v. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
83. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8
(2001).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
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exemptions are supposed to have a “narrow compass.” 86
In passing FOIA, Congress intended to open agency
action to the scrutiny of the public. 87 To this end, both the
provisions of FOIA and cases interpreting the law have
evinced a powerful aversion to agency attempts to hide
agency “law” from public disclosure. Indeed, “[o]ne of the
principal purposes of the Freedom of Information Act is to
eliminate secret law.” 88 The affirmative portions of FOIA
underscore the statute’s aversion to secret law: agency’s are
affirmatively required to disclose “final opinions, including
concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made
in the adjudication of cases;” 89 and “those statements of policy
and interpretations” that have been adopted by the agency. 90
For all the high-minded talk of exposing agency action to
the light of day, FOIA, in practice, is also not without its
limitations. Although FOIA broadly mandates disclosure and
affirmatively requires disclosure of interpretations relied
upon by the agency—federal agencies are often reluctant to
observe the full requirements of the law. Consequently, a
FOIA request for information may languish for months or
even years, and even the onset of litigation does not
guarantee disclosure of records. Additionally, courts have
afforded near-absolute deference to agencies when those
agencies assert that disclosure of information—even with
redactions to protect sources and methods—would cause
harm to national security or law enforcement surveillance
techniques. 91 As a result of this deference, courts routinely
allow the government to withhold documents, in their
entirety, simply because portions of the documents may
contain sensitive material.
Indeed, the government was able to conceal its
interpretation of Section 215 for two years, despite the
86. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989).
87. NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004).
88. Jordan v. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon,
J., concurring) (citation omitted).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B).
91. See e.g., Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because
“courts have little expertise in either international diplomacy or
counterintelligence operations, [they] are in no position to dismiss the [agency’s]
facially reasonable concerns” about the harm that disclosure could cause to
national security.
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existence of at least two separate FOIA lawsuits filed
specifically to compel disclosure of that interpretation. 92 Seen
in this light, FOIA may seem like an ineffective tool; however,
as will be shown, with only slight alteration to current FOIA
litigation practices, the government’s ability to shield secret
legal interpretations of surveillance law can be greatly
diminished, without compromising legitimately protectable
“sources and methods.”
I. THE SOLUTION: THE TEARLINE VAUGHN INDEX
Public debate on the government’s use of Section 215 was
unduly constrained. The public could have readily been
informed of the salient characteristics of the government’s
interpretation of the law—that the term “relevant” had been
interpreted to authorize the production of millions of
“irrelevant” records; 93 that those irrelevant records included
the records of millions of law abiding Americans; 94 and that
the FBI could obtain the orders, not for itself, but for other
intelligence agencies—without disclosing the specifics of the
Section 215 program. 95 This problem could have been avoided
through the compelled production of unclassified summaries
of this legal interpretation—a tearline Vaughn.
The tearline Vaughn is the combination of two types of
documents: the “tearline” and the Vaughn index. First, a
“tearline” is a tool already in use within the intelligence
community. Essentially, tearlines are a way to disseminate
information without revealing the classified information on
which it is based. 96 Tearlines are portions of a document
“that provide the substance of a more highly classified or
controlled report without identifying sensitive sources,
methods, or other operational information.” 97 As one
advocate for their greater use, Steven Aftergood of the

92. See supra note 37. Despite the existence of these lawsuits, the NSA’s
bulk collection of call records under Section 215 remained secret until the
Guardian’s story in 2013.
93. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Intelligence Community Directive 209, Tearline Production and
Dissemination (Sept. 6, 2012), OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE, available at https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-209.pdf.
97. Id.
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Federation of American Scientists, has described them,
tearlines refer “to the practice of segregating and withholding
the most sensitive portions of a document, allowing the
remainder to be ‘torn off,’ literally or figuratively, and widely
disseminated.” 98
As recent practice has shown, it is often possible for the
executive branch to disclose, in general terms, legal analysis
concerning intelligence or law enforcement sources and
methods without revealing the sensitive particulars of those
methods. For example, the DOJ has released unclassified
“white papers” on its legal interpretation of Section 215 and
on the executive branch’s authority to conduct targeted
killings of citizens overseas. 99 These white papers are similar
to tearlines in many respects. They deal, in general terms,
with the substance of the legal analysis supporting the
methods, without revealing the particular sources and
methods at issue. For example, the White Paper on Section
215 does not disclose the particular telecommunication
companies involved in the program; and, indeed, one could
envision an even more abstracted version that dealt only with
“business records” generally, not the particular telephone
records at issue in the NSA’s program. 100 Although Congress
has indicated that the executive branch should employ
tearlines with more frequency, it has not mandated their use
However, without
in any particular circumstance. 101
government creation of an unclassified summary for its own
use, these types of publicly producible documents may not
otherwise exist.
The litigation procedures already in place in FOIA can
help fill this gap. The compelled production of documents,
however, runs contrary to basic FOIA tenets. As a general
rule, agencies are not required to create documents in
response to a FOIA request that do not otherwise exist—with

98. Steven Aftergood, DNI Directive Promotes Use of “Tearline” Documents,
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Sept. 28, 2012), available at
http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/09/tearlines/.
99. Department of Justice White Paper, NBC NEWS MEDIA,
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.p
df; Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony (Aug. 9, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/section215.pdf.
100. See generally id.
101. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(d)(1).
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one common exception: the Vaughn Index. Named for the
seminal DC Circuit decision, Vaughn v. Rosen, the Vaughn
index requires government agencies to create an index of
withheld documents, “specifying in detail which portions of
the document are disclosable and which are allegedly
exempt.” 102
As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Vaughn, the
“traditional adversary nature of our legal system’s form of
dispute resolution” is “seriously distort[ed]” in the typical
FOIA case. 103 This is so because, in ordinary civil litigation,
“the facts relevant to a dispute are more or less equally
available to adverse parties.” 104 But, in FOIA cases, it is
anomalous, but obviously inevitable, that the party with the
greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue
with desirable legal precision for the revelation of the
concealed information.
Obviously the party seeking
disclosure cannot know the precise contents of the documents
sought; secret information is, by definition, unknown to the
party seeking disclosure. In many, if not most, disputes
under the FOIA, resolution centers around the factual nature,
the statutory category, of the information sought. 105
The Vaughn index, then, is used to recalibrate that
imbalance—however slightly. The Vaughn index “describe[s]
the document withheld or any redacted portion thereof,
disclosing as much information as possible without thwarting
the exemption’s purpose.” 106 And the Vaughn index falls
outside of FOIA’s general prohibition against compelled
creation of documents because the index is actually a
procedural litigation tool—a product of the courts’ inherent
authority to regulate the parties before it. It is akin to a
privilege log—a procedural tool common in typical civil
discovery.
The tearline Vaughn, then, is a combination of the
attributes of the tearline and the Vaughn index. First,
agencies are able to produce unclassified “summaries,” even
of classified content and an already-established procedure

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
King v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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exists for doing so—the tearline. Second, in spite of FOIA’s
general prohibition on the creation of documents, the federal
courts are empowered to order the government to create
documents in FOIA cases—and, indeed, often do—
particularly where fairness requires it.
The tearline Vaughn can be implemented in those
instances where a court is caught between accommodating
the executive branch’s need to protect sensitive intelligence
“sources and methods” and honoring Congress’ purpose, in
passing FOIA, of eliminating agency “secret law.” If we accept
that FOIA’s primary purpose is to root out secret law within
government, 107 it follows that courts should not casually
accept government attempts to shield entire documents
containing controlling agency legal interpretations, even if
those documents might contain some legitimately classifiable
information. Courts should be willing to push the executive
branch to be as forthcoming as possible when the documents
are believed to contain agency law. A tearline Vaughn
accomplishes precisely that.
Indeed, such a compelled tearline may be the only
method to ensure government compliance with another
requirement of FOIA—the obligation to segregate and release
non-exempt information. 108 While the government often
contends that redaction of sensitive information would yield
only incomprehensible fragments, such claims are less
credible where the document consists primarily of legal
analysis. Cases, statutes, and legal principles—divorced from
their specific factual bases—can be disclosed without
compromising specific sources or methods. Indeed, the
tearline Vaughn preempts this argument. Faced with choice
of a purportedly incomplete redacted version, or a tearline
Vaughn—the government should welcome the opportunity to
provide a more fulsome explanation in tearline format.
The procedure for litigating the propriety and
completeness of the tearline Vaughn would be similar to
current FOIA litigation practices. In current FOIA litigation,
a FOIA plaintiff is able to challenge the adequacy or

107. Public Citizen, Inc. v. OMB, 598 F.3d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010)(“FOIA
provides no protection for such ‘secret law’ developed and implemented by an
agency.”).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
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sufficiency of the government’s Vaughn index. 109 That is, the
requester can contest that the government has not disclosed
“as much information as possible” about the withheld
documents. 110 The court then reviews the Vaughn, at times,
the withheld documents and decides if the government has
satisfied its obligation. An identical procedure could function
with a tearline Vaughn. After submitting the tearline, the
parties could dispute whether the government had disclosed
“as much information as possible” about the withheld legal
analysis. 111 A reviewing court (in accordance with FOIA’s
current procedures) 112 could examine the original, classified
legal analysis in camera, comparing it to the tearline version
submitted by the government, to settle whether its disclosure
obligations had been satisfied. Such a procedure would ensure
both that the public has the information it needs to critically
assess the government’s legal interpretation while at the
same time maintaining the secrecy of any legitimately
sensitive sources and methods. 113
The tearline Vaughn is preferable to Congressional
investigations, alone, because it marshals the authority of
two branches of the federal government—Congress and the
judiciary. 114 The tearline Vaughn avoids the problem of
selective disclosure provided through discovery. A tearline
Vaughn could be created about any surveillance technique
the government is known to use or any provision of public
law. This process also better addresses the problem posed by
the case of unauthorized leaks—leaving to the judgment of

109. See Davin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1065 (3d Cir.
1995)
(remanding
case
for
further
proceedings and suggesting that another, more detailed Vaughn Index
be required); Church of Scientology Int’l v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
30 F.3d 224, 239–40 (1st Cir. 1994); Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d
972, 979 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding case for a more thorough Vaughn
Index).
110. King, 830 F.2d at 224.
111. Id.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
113. One shortcoming of the tearline Vaughn solution is its availability only
through litigation. Thus, disclosure would be limited to those with the resources
to compel it. However, the existence of some solution is preferable to the status
quo and, eventually, similar types of disclosures could be incorporated into
regular agency responses to FOIA requests—or mandated by Congress.
114. Congress, of course, passed FOIA and has encouraged the executive
branch, by statute, to use tearlines.
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media and publishers what information should be disclosed.
While judges may lack the subject-matter knowledge of many
journalists, federal judges rightly claim the same apparent
neutrality. In addition, the federal judiciary is at least a
formal part of our constitutional structure, lending its role as
arbiter of disclosure an air of democratic legitimacy that
newspaper publishers otherwise lack. Applying the tearline
Vaughn to the case of Section 215 demonstrates its potential.
As described above, in the context of Section 215, the normal
channels of public access failed. The government was able to
conceal from public disclosure for nearly eight years Section
215’s
unprecedentedly
broad
interpretation
and
implementation—in spite of Congressional oversight of its
use, Section 215-derived evidence’s use in a criminal
prosecution, and in spite of two separate FOIA lawsuits
directed at the interpretation. When the levee broke in June
2013, the government’s most cherished secrets, including
Verizon’s participation in the program, came pouring out.
But the buildup in secrets behind the levee was
unnecessary. The government could readily have provided
more information about the government’s interpretation
without compromising the purported information it was
trying to protect. For example, the government could readily
have provided more detailed information about its definition
of “relevance.” 115 The only insight the government previously
revealed concerning Section 215’s interpretation was that it
was “similar to a grand jury subpoena.” 116 But, as the
government well knew, no grand jury subpoena in the history
of the Republic was as broad as even a single Section 215
order. Such understatement served only to deflect criticism
and scrutiny, to conceal the government’s interpretation, and
to block the public from meaningfully debating the propriety
of the statute.
All the government needed to disclose was the fact that,

115. This, of course, presumes that the government actually had conducted
such an interpretation prior to the disclosures. Sadly, it is not always the case
that a searching legal review of a particular technique is performed prior to its
use.
116. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden & Sen. Mark Udall, to Eric Holder,
Attorney General of United States Department of Justice (Sept. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=a3670ed3-9f65-4740b72e-061c7de83f75&download=1.
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under the government’s interpretation, a single Section 215
order could be used to obtain records concerning millions of
Americans, almost all of whom would have no connection
whatsoever to terrorism.
They failed to, however, for
pragmatic reasons: they likely knew that such a disclosure
would lead to public outcry and the elimination of the
program. And, such evasiveness speaks to the democratic
legitimacy of such a law or interpretation.
That type of disclosure would have revealed very little
operationally-sensitive information about the call records
collection program: it would not have revealed that the
government was collecting call records, let alone doing so in
bulk; it would not have revealed the providers that were
turning over call records; and it would not have revealed the
targets of the investigation. 117 It would only have revealed
that the government had interpreted its authority under
Section 215 to allow it to obtain records on millions of
Americans—the very aspect of the program that sparked such
broad public outrage.
CONCLUSION
At least with respect to the Section 215 program, many of
these “unauthorized” disclosures could have been avoided
with more enlightened disclosure policies by Congress, the
Executive branch, or the courts. A more tailored disclosure
policy, such as that provided through a tearline Vaughn,
would have protected the government’s sources, methods, and
targets of investigations while still allowing the public to
engage in a meaningful debate about its use. Furthermore,
the public could compel the government to disclose how it
interpreted the law without disclosing how it implemented the
law.
The tearline Vaughn system cannot claim to be a perfect
system. But, while there may be some difficult cases around
the edges, for the vast majority of techniques of intelligence
programs, the legal principles animating the programs can be
discussed at some level of abstraction without disclosing
sources and methods. And that is precisely the role the
tearline Vaughn can provide.

117. Indeed, the targets remain classified today.
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